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Policies Aﬀecting Work Patterns 
and Labor Income for Women
Ann- Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
2.1    Introduction
Taxes on labor income reduce the incentive for women to work. Child 
care subsidies, on the other hand, increase the incentive for women with 
children to work. Given the taxes on labor income, it may improve welfare 
to introduce subsidies or tax relief on substitutes for mothers’ time in the 
household. However, ten years ago, Sherwin Rosen argued that the child 
care subsidies in Sweden were ineﬃciently high from a welfare perspective 
(Rosen 1997). He noted that the subsidy, in addition to encouraging labor 
supply, also distorts the consumption choice between child care services 
and other types of goods. By making the relative cost of child care services 
cheaper, the subsidy stimulates a socially excessive consumption of child 
care, at the expense of other types of goods. Finding the most eﬃcient child 
care subsidy is a matter of balancing the distortion on the consumption 
mix with the tax- induced labor supply distortion (see Rosen 1997; Sorensen 
1997; and Kleven 2004).
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Our work follows on that initiated by Sherwin Rosen. Sherwin was a truly insightful econo-
mist, who thought about economic issues deeply. His instincts were superb, and he had the 
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In this chapter, we analyze the eﬀects of child care subsidies and other 
policies on female labor supply decisions in a life-  cycle context that has not 
been fully considered in the previous literature. Our starting point is that a 
woman’s labor market decision today may aﬀect her standard of living later 
in life. Consider, for example, a married woman who chooses to devote all of 
her time to family and children, eschewing market work in the expectation 
that she will remain with her husband for her entire life. If her marriage dis-
solves, she will be without the skills necessary to earn a decent living in the 
labor market. Specializing in household production was the wrong decision. 
Even if women took into account the possibility of being single later in life, 
which would lead them to do some market work as insurance against the 
family breakup, those investing little in work skills who experienced marital 
breakup would end up poor and then may require social support. Knowing 
that social assistance will cushion the blow to women who ﬁ  nd themselves 
without their husband’s income, moreover, women will likely choose to work 
too little in the market from a social perspective. The implication is that pre-
vious analyses have understated the value of policies such as child care that 
are designed to encourage women to work.
We consider child care subsidies and three other policies that impact 
women’s labor supply: paid parental leave, in-  work beneﬁ  ts, and tax relief 
on substitutes for household goods and services. Child care subsidies and 
paid parental leave have long been studied as cornerstones of the Swed-
ish welfare state, while the last two policies are relatively new, with little 
attention to their impact on women with children. Our measures of labor 
supply are labor force participation, work time, and time in parental leave, 
based on data from the labor force surveys. We develop a new model to 
examine the impact of the policies on the work outcomes, and we then 
link the model to observed behavior. We conclude by showing that policy 
instruments beyond child care subsidies could stimulate the labor supply 
of women with children as eﬀectively as child care subsidies would, with-
out inducing the overconsumption of child care services that troubled 
Rosen.
2.2      Labor Supply of Women and Women with Children
To begin, table 2.1 summarizes the employment patterns for women and 
men in Sweden, and by way of comparison, in the United States. In the 
developed world, Sweden’s family policies are among the most generous, 
and the average tax rate and beneﬁ  ts when not working are among the high-
est, while the U.S. family policies, taxes, and beneﬁ  ts are among the lowest, 
giving us a sharp contrast.
The table shows that labor force participation among women is higher 
in Sweden than in the United States but that American women are more Policies Affecting Work Patterns and Labor Income for Women    5 9
likely to be at work at any given time. Multiplying the ﬁ  rst column in table 
2.1 by the total number of weeks per year, we calculate the annual average 
work hours in the two societies. The average annual work hours of women 
aged sixteen to ﬁ  fty-  four in Sweden is 988, compared to 1,118 in the United 
States. For women and men aged sixteen to ﬁ  fty-  four, average annual 
hours are 1,173 in Sweden and 1,329 in the United States. These numbers 
are comparable with what is reported in other studies (see Freeman and 
Schettkat 2005).
From the mid-  1960s until the early 1990s recession, female labor force 
participation in Sweden increased dramatically. Since then, female partici-
pation has been stable, with only cyclical variations. In contrast, male labor 
force participation trended down modestly before the recession but has been 
stable, except for cyclical changes since the beginning of the 1990s. Women’s 
labor force participation at 80 percent is almost as high as that of men at 
85 percent.
Women with children have high rates of labor force participation in 
Sweden, although the rate is slightly lower for mothers with small chil-
dren (ﬁ  gure 2.1). However, some of this diﬀerence may reﬂ  ect diﬀerent 
measurement protocols. Swedish statistics count women who are on paid 
parental leave from a job as employed. Because parental leave is popular 
in Sweden, with an average time on paid parental leave of ten months, 
and because fathers take a modest share of the family’s paid parental 
leave (20 percent in 2006, up from 10 percent in 2000), this biases female 
participation upward relative to that in the United States. For a better 
comparison, we need to redeﬁ  ne women on parental leave as being out of 
the labor force in Sweden. As that is not possible in the aggregate labor 
force survey data, we treat all women who have children below one year 
of age as being on parental leave and out of the labor force. This is crude 
but realistic, as more than 80 percent of mothers who have a child younger 
Table 2.1  Employment patterns for men and women in Sweden and the United States, ages 
sixteen to ﬁ  fty-  four: 2005








labor force  
Labor force/
population
Women (Sweden) 19.0 33.3 0.81 0.94 0.78
Women (United States) 21.5 33.1 0.95 0.95 0.72
Men (Sweden) 26.1 39.3 0.87 0.93 0.82
Men (United States)   29.6   38.3   0.97   0.95   0.84
Source: The labor force surveys, Arbetskraftsundersökningar (AKU) for Sweden, and the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) for the United States. The AKU went through some changes in 2005; see: www.scb.se.
Note: The measures of average actual weekly work hours of those who are present at the workplace 
(column [2]) is based on the age group sixteen to sixty-  four for Sweden and the United States. The work 
hours/present workers for the United States is based on March 2005 and not the yearly number.60    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
than one year old are not present at the workplace during the week of 
measurement.1 Figure 2.1 reveals that this correction substantially reduces 
participation rates.
Parental leave is one reason to be absent from work, but there are also 
other reasons, such as vacation, sick leave, sick children, and so forth. Figure 
2.2 shows the employment rate and the rate of presence at the workplace for 
women with children. Counting only women who were present at the work-
place sometime during the week of measurement, the rate falls to around 
50 percent for mothers with small children.
Finally, table 2.2 shows that even if we assume that all women in Sweden 
who have a child younger than one year of age are on parental leave and are 
counted as being out of the labor force, women with children have higher 
labor force participation in Sweden than in the United States. There is a real 
behavioral diﬀerence in the diﬀering participation of women with children 
in the United States and Sweden.
1. Moreover, we know that mothers take an average of about ten months of paid paren-
tal leave (Ekberg, Eriksson, and Friebel 2005). Additionally, we know that mothers tend to 
lengthen their maternity leave by using the low ﬂ  at rate paid parental leave (Westerlund, Lind-
bald, and Larsson 2005).
Fig. 2.1    Labor force participation rate (labor force/  population; LFP) for women 
with children (children less than seventeen years old) and for women with small chil-
dren (children less than seven years old)
Source: The labor force surveys (AKU), Statistics Sweden.
Note: The two lower graphs account for women with children below one year who are on 
parental leave and deﬁ  ned as out of the labor force.Policies Affecting Work Patterns and Labor Income for Women    6 1
2.2.1    Working  Time
Women are less likely to work full-  time than men, and women with chil-
dren, especially those with small children, are less likely to work full-  time 
than those without children (see ﬁ  gure 2.3). Comparing Sweden and the 
United States, table 2.3 indicates that women with children work less than 
women without children in both countries, while table 2.4 shows a similar 
pattern in hours worked per week. To see whether the lower work time of 
Fig. 2.2    Swedish female employment and presence at the workplace relative to 
population by category
Source: The labor force surveys (AKU), Statistics Sweden.
Table 2.2  Labor force participation as percent in labor force of women and men 
(ages sixteen to sixty-  four) by age of youngest child in household in 
Sweden and the United States: March 2005
   
With child 
age   17  
With child 
age   7   All  
With child age 
  17 and   1  
With child age 
  7 and   1
Women (Sweden) 84 81 74 78 67
Women (United States) 71 63 69 — —
Men (Sweden) 93 94 78 — —
Men (United States)   94   96   81   —   —
Source: The labor force surveys, the CPS (United States), and AKU (Sweden).
Note: The ﬁ  rst two columns show the labor force participation rate (labor force/population) 
for women and men with children (children less than seventeen years old for Sweden and less 
than eighteen years old for the United States) and for women and men with small children 
(children less than seven years old in Sweden and less than six years old in the United States). 
The fourth and ﬁ  fth columns assume that women with children below one year of age are on 
parental leave and are deﬁ  ned as out of the labor force. Dashed cells   not applicable.62    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
women with children is due to mothers reducing their working time, it is 
necessary to use microdata. Kennerberg (2007) does this, comparing the 
working time of women before and after they have a child to their childless 
counterparts. Prior to childbirth, 90 percent of women worked in a full- time 
job, just as women without children did. After the birth of the ﬁ  rst child, 
about 10 percent of mothers reduced their work time when returning to work 
after their parental leave, whereas women who did not have a child increased 
their work time slightly over the same period.
While women are more likely to work part- time after having children, the 
reverse is true for men. This suggests that there is some substitutability of 
males for female work time and/  or that men with children feel more com-
pelled to earn instead of taking leisure. Selection into marriage could also be 
an explanation, as men who are likely to be part- timers may not get married 
Fig. 2.3    The share working more than thirty-  ﬁ  ve hours a week for men, women, 
women with children less than seventeen years old, and women with children less than 
seven years old
Source: The labor force surveys (AKU), Statistics Sweden.
Table 2.3  Percentage of persons working part-  time in total employment by 
category: 2004
Women Men
   
No 
children   One child  
Two or more 




children   Total
Sweden 14.6 16.7 22.2 17.9 5.2 3.4 4.3
United States  10.1   15.8   23.6   14.6   3.5   1.8   2.7
Source: Women at Work: An Economic Perspective (Boeri, Del Boca, and Pissarides 2005).Policies Affecting Work Patterns and Labor Income for Women    6 3
to the same extent as others. We do not know of any longitudinal study that 
diﬀerentiates these eﬀects for men.
2.2.2      Work Incentives and Single Women with Children
The work behavior of single women with children is also important in 
female labor supply and in the level of poverty. Families with a single female 
parent and no male parent are disproportionately represented in poverty. 
In countries where female labor force participation is high, the share of 
poor among single mothers is also relatively low.2 What are the incentives 
to work for single women with children? How responsive is this group to 
incentives?
An important measure of work incentives is the replacement rate when 
not working. In most countries, this replacement rate is higher at lower-
  income levels, where single mothers are overrepresented. For Sweden, 
Flood, Pylkkänen, and Wahlberg (2007) calculate the average replacement 
rate for single mothers on social assistance in 1999 to be 91 percent for a 
half-  time job and 79 percent for a full-  time job. Andrén (2003) and Flood, 
Pylkkänen, and Wahlberg (2007) have estimated structural static models of 
labor supply for single mothers that suggest that Swedish single mothers do 
respond positively to increased returns to work. Moreover, the labor supply 
elasticities are signiﬁ  cantly larger for single mothers than for other groups. 
Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg (2004) estimate a structural static model of 
household labor supply to capture labor supply among two-  parent families 
in Sweden. We summarize in table 2.5 the estimated elasticities.
2. See Nyberg (2005) and Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner (2006).
Table 2.4  Female and male actual average weekly work hours among those who 
worked in Sweden and the United States, ages sixteen to sixty-  four: 
March 2005
      Actual work hours  
Sweden
 Women 31.2
  Women with child age   7 28.7
 Men 36.5
  Men with child age   7 36.5
United States
 Women 33.1
  Women with child age   6 30.6
 Men 38.3
    Men with child age   6   41.5  
Source: The labor force surveys, AKU (Sweden), and the CPS (United States).
Note: The numbers are average hours worked in preceding week for the U.S. sample. In Swe-
den, they are the actual hours worked among those who worked.64    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
2.2.3    Fertility
In the 1950s through the 1970s, countries with high fertility had low rates 
of labor participation for women, but in the 1980s through the 1990s, this 
pattern reversed itself. Sweden and the United States, in particular, com-
bined high rates of female participation with high fertility for an advanced 
country (ﬁ  gure 2.4). During the crisis years in the beginning of the 1990s, 
the fertility rate in Sweden dipped, but the rate is still high and has begun to 
catch up to its old levels. Figure 2.4 records the total fertility rate for Sweden 
and the United States. Because Sweden’s large welfare state requires tax 
revenues from a working population, combining work and fertility may be 
more important for Sweden’s success than for that of the United States.
2.3    Policies  that  Aﬀect Participation of Women with Children
We consider next the four welfare state policies that are most relevant to 
the participation of women with children.
2.3.1      The Paid Parental Leave System
Since 1955, employed Swedish women have had the right to paid maternal 
leave by way of the social insurance system. Table 2.6 provides a description 
of the parental leave scheme since 1995. In 1974, Sweden became the ﬁ  rst 
country to replace the maternity leave system with a parental leave system, 
where the same rules for fathers and mothers applied. Parental leave initially 
covered six months of payment, but it was gradually extended over the years 
to cover ﬁ  fteen months by the year 1990. In 1993, parents shared 360 days, 
with a compensation corresponding to 90 percent of gross earning up to a 
ceiling and another ninety days at the guaranteed ﬂ  at rate of sixty Swedish 
kronor (SEK) per day.
The Swedish parental leave system is unique in terms of generosity and 
ﬂ  exibility. Government expenditures on paid parental leave is about 17 bil-
lion SEK, or about 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Parents 
have the legal right to take parental leave for up to eighteen months without 
the risk of losing their jobs. Parents can use their days of paid parental leave 
in a ﬂ  exible way until the child becomes 8 years old. In addition, parents 
have the legal right to reduce their working time to 75 percent of a normal 
work week at the workplace until the child turns 8 years old. In 1995, the 
Table 2.5  The labor supply elasticity of single mothers, women, and men in Sweden
      Single mothers   Women   Men  
  Labor supply elasticity  0.62–0.77a   0.1b   0.05b  
aFlood, Pylkkänen, and Wahlberg (2007) and Andrén (2003).
bFlood, Hansen, and Wahlberg (2004).Fig. 2.4    Total fertility rates for Sweden and the United States





parent   Duration  
Replacement 
rate (%)  
Ceiling 
(∗PBA)   PBA
1995 450 30 360 80 7.5 35,700
1996 450 30 360 75 7.5 36,200
1997 450 30 360 75 7.5 36,300
1998 450 30 360 80 7.5 36,400
1999 450 30 360 80 7.5 36,400
2000 450 30 360 80 7.5 36,600
2001 450 30 360 80 7.5 36,900
2002 480 60 390 80 7.5 36,900
2003 480 60 390 80 7.5 38,600
2004 480 60 390 80 7.5 39,300
2005 480 60 390 80 7.5 39,400
2006a 480 60 390 80 10 39,700
2007 480 60 390 80 10 40,300
2008   480   60   390   80   10   41,000
Source: Bergemann and van den Berg (2006) and information from publications of the Na-
tional Social Insurance Board. See: http://www.forsakringskassan.se/.
Note: The daily ﬂ  at compensation for the ninety days has been 60 SEK from 1995 to 2005 and 
180 SEK from July 1, 2006. The price base amount (PBA) is a yearly adjusted amount used, 
among other things, to ensure that various beneﬁ  ts do not decline in value because of an in-
crease in the general price level (inﬂ  ation).
aThe ceiling was raised for children born after July 1, 2006.66    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
government introduced the so-  called daddy month, which required one 
month of the paid parental leave to be used by each parent. In practice, 
fathers could no longer transfer all their paid parental leave to the mother. 
Unless at least one month was used by the father, it could not be used by 
either parent. In 2002, a second father quota was implemented. The reform 
reserved two months for each parent. At the same time, the total time of 
entitlement to paid parental leave for the family increased by thirty days. 
In practice, this implied that an extra month available only for fathers was 
added to the existing paid parental leave scheme.
2.3.2    Child  Care  Subsidies
Publicly provided child care was introduced in the mid-  1960s. The pres-
sure on municipalities to provide day care became larger in the mid-  1970s, 
and by 1983, publicly provided day care covered 52 percent of preschool 
children. By 2004, over 80 percent of preschool children were in public day 
care, and nearly 80 percent of children aged six to nine years were enrolled 
in after-  school centers.
Gradually increasing fees for child care in the 1990s and diﬀerences in 
fees across municipalities led the government to impose a ceiling on fees, 
the maximum fee system, in 2002. The reform ﬁ  xed the fees for child care 
at a certain percent of parental income and speciﬁ  ed a maximum cost to 
the household.3 The maximum fee system reduced diﬀerences in fees across 
municipalities and cut the child care fee for most families. The share of child 
care costs covered by private fees fell from around 20 percent to around 10 
percent.
From 2001 to 2003, the program was expanded to allow the children of 
parents who were unemployed and on parental leave the right to attend 
preschool at least ﬁ  fteen hours per week. Universal preschool for four-   and 
ﬁ  ve-  year-  olds was also introduced. Although preschool is not compulsory, 
the municipalities are obliged to provide places in preschool for the children 
of parents who wish it.
The average cost per child in preschool was almost 96,000 SEK in 2004. 
The total cost for preschool in 2004 was about 34 billion SEK, or about 1.3 
percent of GDP.
2.3.3    In-  Work  Beneﬁ  ts
Following the lead of the United States and the United Kingdom, many 
industrialized countries have adopted some kind of in- work beneﬁ  t4—a ben-
3. In 2005, the child care fee for a family with one child in day care was 3 percent of fam-
ily income, with a maximum fee of 1,260 SEK per month. The fee for the second child was 2 
percent of family income, with a maximum fee of 840 SEK per month. For the third child, the 
fee was 1 percent of family income, with a maximum fee of 420 SEK a month. There was no 
fee for the fourth child.
4. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand 
now have such systems.Policies Affecting Work Patterns and Labor Income for Women    6 7
eﬁ  t or tax credit conditioned on labor income that aims to improve work 
incentives and reduce poverty. In January 2007, Sweden also introduced a 
system of in-  work beneﬁ  ts in the form of a tax credit for the employed. The 
tax credit became more generous in January 2008 and January 2009. The 
tax credit, in combination with a general income tax allowance, implies 
that no tax needs to be paid on labor income up to yearly earnings of about 
39,000 SEK. This can be compared to the median income, which is about 
220,000 SEK per year. Then, about 25 percent of labor income earned on 
top of this limit is tax exempt, until a yearly income level of 116,000 is 
reached. For income above this limit, only about 6.5 percent of labor income 
is tax exempt. The maximum tax allowance is reached when the yearly labor 
income is about 300,000 SEK. The maximum tax credit amounts to about 
18,000 SEK per year. The credit is not phased out, and it is more generous 
for workers above age sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
2.3.4      Tax Relief for Household Substitutes
A number of countries in Europe—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, and France—have introduced systems of subsidies or tax relief on the 
purchase of substitutes for household services. After a long debate, in July 
2007, Sweden introduced the beneﬁ  ts of tax relief on household services, 
including house cleaning, laundry, ironing, gardening, and babysitting. As 
long as the service is carried out within the home, half of the labor costs of 
the substitute labor up to a ceiling is deductible from the income tax pay-
ments of the buyer.
2.4      A Model of Female Work Behavior
How have Sweden’s family policies in the form of parental leave and child 
care subsidies aﬀected women’s labor supply and their economic situation? 
How might the more recent changes of in-  work beneﬁ  ts and tax relief for 
household services aﬀect these outcomes?
We examine these questions in the context of a small theoretical model of 
female decision making. This section gives a nontechnical presentation of the 
model and summarizes the main results. The appendix contains details.
The model is set in two periods. In the ﬁ  rst period, women are married. 
In the second period, there is an exogenous probability that the marriage 
dissolves. At the beginning of the ﬁ  rst period, the woman makes her career 
choice: allocating available time into market work and family work. As 
the allocation of time also has consequences for the future, she takes into 
account the possibility that the marriage may dissolve in period two when 
making her period-  one time allocation decision. Viewing labor supply in 
the ﬁ  rst period as an investment, we let the woman’s labor supply in the ﬁ  rst 
period also determine her supply in the second period. This assumption 
captures the fact that the decision to choose a weak labor market attachment 
early in life is likely to induce a lower income in the future.68    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
Women derive utility from general goods consumption and from the con-
sumption of a family good. The family good can be produced in the house-
hold by the use of own time, or it can be purchased in the market. These are 
perceived to be substitutes, although not necessarily at a one-  to-  one ratio. 
The payoﬀ from investing time in the family is the utility the home- produced 
family good yields. The payoﬀ from investing time in market work is market 
income net of taxes. We use the model to predict consequences of changing 
each of the four policies described in section 2.3 for the behavior or poverty 
of women with children.
2.4.1    Paid  Parental  Leave
Increased generosity in paid parental leave should reduce women’s invest-
ment in a more market- oriented career. This is because there is a direct nega-
tive eﬀect on market investment when the payments for family time increase. 
In addition, the increased taxation that funds the leave will have a negative 
eﬀect on work incentives. We expect poverty among divorced women to 
increase, because women should invest more in a family- oriented career, and 
because the reform requires higher taxes.
The eﬀect of the ﬁ  rst daddy- month reform in 1995, which cut the leave time 
for mothers, depends on whether mothers choose to exhaust the paid paren-
tal leave periods. The reform is more likely to increase female labor supply 
if women exhaust their leave periods. The second daddy-  month reform in 
2002 added an extra month of parental leave, which, in practice, was only 
available for fathers. Counterintuitively, this tends to reduce women’s invest-
ment in market- oriented careers. The reason is that an increase in the father’s 
time at home increases the female spouse’s consumption of the family good, 
which induces her to buy less care time on the market. In fact, she reduces 
her market purchases of the family good by more than the father’s increased 
contribution. The reason for this is that the reform needs to be ﬁ  nanced. 
An increase in the paid home time for fathers requires increased tax rates 
to ﬁ  nance the reform, which reduces the incentives to supply market work. 
Therefore, female market work is reduced, which implies that she works more 
in the household in response to the father’s increased contribution of the 
family good. The marginal care of children is provided by market-  supplied 
child care rather than by the mother, whose time is inframarginal. It is the 
father’s time that substitutes for market purchases of child care—not for the 
mother’s time. The reduction in market demand for child care, coupled with 
the tax eﬀect, causes female market time to decline with the second reform. 
Poverty among divorced women increases, both because women invest more 
in family-  oriented careers, and because the reform requires higher taxes.
2.4.2    Child  Care  Subsidies
Introducing a child care subsidy should increase women’s time in the mar-
ket and reduce poverty among divorced women, provided women ﬁ  nance Policies Affecting Work Patterns and Labor Income for Women    6 9
a minor share of the government expenditures on the child care subsidy. 
The opposite holds when women must ﬁ  nance a major part of the subsidy. 
Furthermore, the ceiling on fees has a positive eﬀect on labor supply. This 
is because the dampening eﬀect on labor supply is removed when the fee no 
longer increases with income. Thus, women invest more in market-  oriented 
careers in case the child care fee is uniform and ﬁ  xed instead of income 
related. However, for low-  income families, the negative eﬀect of income-
  dependent fees remains. Moreover, such a reform increases the welfare gap 
between married and divorced women. This follows, as a ceiling reduces the 
fee for high-  income earners relative to low-  income earners.
2.4.3    In-  Work  Beneﬁ  ts
The model yields the following result: if women ﬁ  nance a minor share of 
the government expenditures on the in- work beneﬁ  t, a steeper phase- in pro-
ﬁ  le increases women’s time in the market, reduces poverty among divorced 
mothers, and reduces the welfare gap between married and divorced women 
for women in the phase- in region. If women ﬁ  nance a major share of the in- 
work beneﬁ  t, the eﬀect is ambiguous. When women can transfer the burden 
of ﬁ  nancing the in- work beneﬁ  t to other citizens, the direct eﬀect of the ben-
eﬁ  t dominates the tax eﬀect, and women will invest more time in the market. 
The poverty among divorced women falls, both because women choose more 
market careers, and because the in-  work beneﬁ  t increases.
The more generous in-  work beneﬁ  t, which is only available to divorced 
women in the model, will reduce the dispersion in well-  being between mar-
ried and divorced women. This follows because the in-  work beneﬁ  t directly 
increases the income of divorced women, and because labor income increases 
as women invest more in market-  oriented careers.
A steeper phase-  out range has an ambiguous eﬀect on market invest-
ments, poverty, and welfare dispersion for women in the phase-  out region.
2.4.4    Household  Substitutes
If the market for household substitutes is small, introducing a price sub-
sidy on the purchased household goods will induce women to invest more 
in market careers and to consume more household goods; it will also reduce 
poverty among divorced women and reduce the welfare gap between married 
and divorced women.
A subsidy reduces the price of the market-  produced household goods, 
increasing total consumption of household goods. As market-  purchased 
goods become relatively cheaper, the amount of household goods bought 
from the market increases, at the expense of home-  produced household 
goods. Thus, women will invest more in market- oriented careers, as they ﬁ  nd 
it optimal to substitute household goods produced by own time for market-
  produced household goods. This is the distortion that Rosen focused on in 
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also improve women’s economic situations in case of divorce, thus reducing 
poverty among divorced women.
In addition, subsidizing market-  provided household goods reduces the 
welfare diﬀerence between married and divorced women, even though one 
assumes that only married women buy the subsidized household service. 
The primary eﬀect of subsidizing market-  provided household goods is to 
induce women to invest more in labor market skills during the investment 
years. This has more value to women who eventually divorce than to married 
women. Married women work more after the investment period than they 
would in the absence of the subsidy, but most of that income merely replaces 
household production with market production. Although there is a small 
increase in welfare from using the cheaper technology to produce the same 
goods (and therefore to consume more total goods), most of the income 
nets little gain, because it merely allows technology substitution. Divorced 
women use the incremental income to purchase additional goods rather than 
to produce the same goods with a diﬀerent technology. As a result, the gain 
to divorced women from the additional labor supply is ﬁ  rst order, whereas 
the gain to married women is second order. This narrows the gap in welfare 
between married and divorced women.
At the same time, the tax increases needed to subsidize the household 
substitutes imply higher taxes on work. This in turn discourages women 
from investing in market- oriented careers. This eﬀect, however, will be small 
when the market for household goods is small. Then, the cost of ﬁ  nancing 
the subsidy and the required tax increase will be low, implying a modest 
adverse impact on women’s investment in market work.
2.5      Linking the Model of Policy Eﬀects to Work Patterns 
and Labor Income for Women
Having described the employment patterns of women (section 2.2) and 
having developed a theoretical model to determine how women’s labor mar-
ket outcomes can be linked to the four policies in focus (section 2.4), we now 
examine the relation between the patterns and the model.
2.5.1    Paid  Parental  Leave
The generous duration and levels of parental leave payments in our model 
are the most likely factors explaining the long time spent in maternity leave 
in Sweden. This view is supported by empirical evidence (Pylkkänen and 
Smith 2004), which shows that a higher compensation rate during parental 
leave prolongs the break from market work. Mothers in Sweden take an 
average of ten months oﬀ for paid maternity leave.
It is likely, moreover, that the right to paid parental leave, combined with 
the legal right to return to previous employment, explains some of the high 
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children below the age of one are counted as out of the labor force; see table 
2.2). This is consistent with empirical research. Ruhm (1998), using data for 
nine European countries over the period from 1969 to 1993, found that the 
right to paid leave raises the percentage of women employed by between 3 
and 4 percent. Only about one-  quarter of this eﬀect can be attributed to an 
increase in women who are registered as employed but are absent from work 
due to the parental leave program. Ruhm oﬀers two explanations. First, 
women who would otherwise choose not to participate may search for a job 
in order to qualify for the paid parental leave scheme. (Because parental leave 
is disproportionately enjoyed by women but is paid for by men, the policy 
raises the value of work for women.) Second, the scheme may speed up the 
reentry to work. The reason is that some mothers who would have quit their 
jobs to take a long leave period now ﬁ  nd it worthwhile to return to work 
sooner in order to remain in their old job. In the Swedish case, Ronsen and 
Sundström (2002) ﬁ  nd that the right to paid parental leave, coupled with the 
legal right to return to their previous jobs, speeds up the return to employ-
ment for women. However, once these rights exist, prolonging the maternity 
leave period and extending the right to it may reduce labor supply, as it pro-
longs the time in parental leave. This suggests that a slightly less generous 
parental leave scheme—in terms of payment and duration—would increase 
female labor supply—in terms of a shorter maternity leave—without induc-
ing women to drop out of the labor force.
The Swedish parental leave scheme provides parents with the legal right 
to reduce their work time to 75 percent of a full-  time job (at their full-  time 
hourly wage) until the child is eight years of age. This rule encourages less 
work hours but most likely contributes to higher labor force participation. 
Cross- country analyses have shown that there is a positive link between part-
  time job opportunities and female labor force participation (see Del Boca 
and Pasqua 2005). Thus, the legal right to reduce work time from full-  time 
to part-  time may have a positive eﬀect on the participation decision but a 
potentially negative eﬀect on the intensity decision.
Consistent with our theoretical analysis, the empirical evaluations of the 
daddy-  quota reforms (Ekberg, Eriksson, and Friebel 2005; and Eriksson 
2005) indicate that the ﬁ  rst daddy-  quota reform increased women’s labor 
supply, whereas the second reform reduced it. See table 2.7 for a comparison 
of the use of parental leave days before and after each daddy- quota reform. 
This suggests that the second reform, which restricted the number of trans-
ferable months and extended the total family leave time, was not successful 
from a female labor supply perspective.
The parental leave system probably aﬀects the wages of women rela-
tive to men. As parental leave is mainly used by mothers, the program may 
reduce human capital of women relative men, which may aﬀect earnings 
diﬀerentials. Of course, this does not imply that the women are worse oﬀ 
with the program than without it.72    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
Datta Gupta, Smith, and Verner (2006) discuss how a diﬀerentiated take-
 up rate of parental leave may induce a high personal penalty for fathers who 
take leave. They argue that mothers may be induced to select into relatively 
low-  paid jobs in the public sector, where it is easy to combine a career with 
family and where the personal penalty of leave is especially low, whereas men 
sort into the private sector and become the family breadwinner. They also 
argue that the large employment opportunities in the public sector, which 
supply particularly generous and ﬂ  exible parental leave schemes, may have 
induced gender-  segmented labor markets in the Nordic countries (see also 
Albrecht, Edin, and Vroman 1999).
2.5.2    Child  Care  Subsidies
Studies of the eﬀects on labor supply of child care policy ﬁ  nd that high 
availability and subsidized fees tend to increase female labor supply. The 
size of the eﬀects, however, is less clear (Jaumotte 2003). A study of the 
access and price of child care in Denmark found that availability had a 
positive eﬀect on female labor supply, whereas higher fees had a negative 
eﬀect (Simonsen 2005). Domeij and Klein (2008), in a calibrated dynamic 
life-  cycle model for Germany, show that the labor supply of mothers with 
small children would be large if Germany expanded the availability of highly 
subsidized child care.
But Sweden appears to be an outlier in this respect. An evaluation of the 
Swedish child care fee reform of 2002 did not ﬁ  nd that the reform signiﬁ  -
cantly aﬀected female work hours and participation (Lundin, Mörk, and 
Öckert 2007). A possible interpretation is that although child care subsidies 
have historically played an important role for female labor supply by reduc-
ing the costs of working, further increases in an already-  high subsidy may 
have only marginal eﬀects on mothers’ labor supply. If true, this suggests 
that a reduction in the child care subsidy would not cause major dropout 
from the labor market.
Table 2.7  Mean number of parental leave days for the ﬁ  rst and second daddy-  month 
reforms: the ﬁ  rst seventeen months
1995 reform 2002 reform
       Before   After   Before   After  
Father 23 28 31 34
  Mother  311   286   259   264  
Source: Eriksson (2005). The total family parental leave days with an income-  based payment 
in 1995 and 2002 are 360 and 390, respectively.
Note: Note that the number of parental leave days in this table is measured seventeen months 
after the birth. We know that fathers use their parental leave days to a larger extent when the 
child is older, which tends to underestimate the number of parental leave days the father is 
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2.5.3    In-  Work  Beneﬁ  ts
In- work  beneﬁ  ts have only recently been implemented in Sweden, so we 
rely on theory and experiences in other countries to suggest the directions 
and size of eﬀects.
The United States introduced the earned income tax credit (EITC) more 
than thirty years ago and has expanded it signiﬁ  cantly since then. The EITC 
is now the largest cash transfer program at the federal level for low-  income 
families. In 2003, about 20 million families received a total of $34 billion 
in beneﬁ  ts from it. The EITC is targeted toward low-  income families with 
children. The largest group receiving the in- work beneﬁ  t is single mothers.5 It 
has a phase- in region, where the size of the tax credit is given as a proportion 
of earned income. Once the maximum EITC is reached, the credit is held 
ﬁ  xed at its maximum level until the phase-  out region starts. The tax credit 
is eventually phased out completely.6
Evaluations of the EITC in the United States draw quite a positive pic-
ture of the impact of the EITC on labor supply. Eissa and Liebman (1996) 
compared the labor supply responses of single women with children to the 
responses of single women with no children when the earned income tax 
credit expanded in 1986. They showed that between 1984 to 1986 and 1988 to 
1990, single women with children increased their relative labor force partici-
pation by up to 2.8 percentage points. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) found 
that 63 percent of the increase in labor force participation of single families 
in the United States between 1984 and 1996 was due to the expansion of 
the EITC. The participation decision rather than the hour decision appears 
most inﬂ  uenced by the EITC.7
Will this type of policy have a similar eﬀect in Sweden and in other less 
market- oriented economies as in the United States? Kolm (2008) provides a 
discussion of an earned income tax credit in a Swedish context. Simulation 
studies that take account of European institutional settings when estimat-
ing the eﬀect of in-  work beneﬁ  ts on labor market performance suggest that 
this will be the case. Although the Swedish tax credit is slightly diﬀerent 
than the U.S. one and is not targeted speciﬁ  cally toward single mothers, the 
5. See Eissa and Hoynes (2006).
6. For the year 2006 (tax year 2005), income must have been less than $35,263 ($37,263 mar-
ried ﬁ  ling jointly) with two or more qualifying children; less than $31,030 ($33,030 married 
ﬁ  ling jointly) with one qualifying child; or less than $11,750 ($13,750 married ﬁ  ling jointly) 
with no qualifying children. The maximum credits are $4,400 with two or more qualifying 
children; $2,662 with one qualifying child; or $399 with no qualifying children. Available at: 
www.irs.gov/ eitc.
7. The drawback with a tax credit of the EITC type is that the increased marginal tax rates in 
the phase-  out region might create disincentives to work for those already in the labor market. 
The evaluations of the EITC seem to show that these eﬀects exist but that the magnitude is 
small. The EITC also tends to reduce incentives to enter the labor market for secondary family 
earners. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) show evidence for such an eﬀect, but again, the eﬀect seems 
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empirical evidence of the labor supply elasticity of single mothers reviewed 
earlier suggests that they are likely to respond to improved work incentives 
in the desired direction.
2.5.4      Tax Relief on Household Substitutes
This policy is also so recent in Sweden that we have to rely on the expe-
rience of other countries. Our model exercise suggests that tax relief on 
household substitutes enables women to work more in the labor market, as 
they can substitute market- purchased household services for own household 
time. It improves welfare to introduce subsidies or a tax relief on household 
substitutes, child care being the most signiﬁ  cant example. Sketchy evalu-
ations of the systems in other countries show that the policies appear to 
increase employment. However, more careful empirical evaluations are 
needed in order to clarify the contributions of these policies.
It also may be important to have access to a market for household substi-
tutes. Freeman and Schettkat (2005) propose this as an explanation for much 
of the EU-  U.S. employment and hour diﬀerences that are observed. They 
argue that in the United States, there has been a more extensive shift of tra-
ditional household production—food preparation, child care, elderly care, 
house cleaning—to the market than in Europe. However, Sweden diﬀers 
from the EU average in some important ways. When it comes to child care, 
the generous child care subsidies in Sweden have induced an extensive shift 
of child care from the household to the market sector. Freeman and Schett-
kat (2005) present numbers on the percentage of children under the age of 
three enrolled in formal day care. In Sweden, 48 percent use formal day care, 
whereas the number is 54 percent in the United States; the European average 
is 29 percent. But markets for other types of household services are either 
nonexistent or relatively small in Sweden. Swedes spend about 7.7 hours a 
week cooking at home, whereas U.S. citizens spend only about 4.1 hours a 
week cooking at home (see Freeman and Schettkat 2005).
Detailed time-  use data for Sweden and the United States show that 
women spend more time cooking, cleaning, and so forth than women in the 
United States. Employed women in Sweden allocate thirteen hours a week 
on such tasks, compared to ten hours for women in the United States. The 
corresponding numbers for men are almost seven hours for Sweden and a 
bit over three hours for the United States. Employed women in the United 
States, however, do work more in the market and consume less leisure than 
Swedish women. The same pattern holds for men.
High taxes and relatively high wages at the lower end of the wage distribu-
tion make household substitutes expensive in Sweden. The child care subsidy 
is one notable exception that is pushing in the direction of increased labor 
supply, and the question is whether tax relief on household substitutes can 
further increase women’s attachment to the labor market, as suggested by 
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2.6    Conclusion
This chapter has linked the distinctive features of the labor supply of 
Swedish women, particularly those with small children, to Swedish family 
policies—especially the paid parental leave system and the child care subsi-
dies. Based on our theoretical framework, as well as on previous theoretical 
and empirical research, we conclude that the Swedish ﬂ  exible parental leave 
system, with its generous legal rights to return to the previous employer 
and its heavily subsidized day care, helps explain the high labor force par-
ticipation rate among women with children. However, the generosity of the 
paid parental leave system, in terms of payment and duration, also most 
likely explains why we observe such long career breaks for women following 
childbirths in Sweden. In addition, the two daddy-  quota reforms that were 
carried out in 1995 and 2002, respectively, seem to have encouraged fathers 
to take longer parental leave but have not induced mothers to work more—
at least not the 2002 reform.
Returning to Rosen’s analysis of the Swedish child care subsidies from an 
eﬃciency viewpoint with which we began, a natural concluding question is, 
could child care subsidies be replaced by another policy instrument that can 
stimulate the labor supply of women with children, without distorting the 
consumption mix in favor of child care services? Our answer is yes.
The subsidized child care in Sweden, which is available only to employed 
parents, can be viewed as an in-  work beneﬁ  t.8 As the mother is usually the 
primary caretaker and thus the last person to leave the household for a job, 
the child care subsidy can be expected to have a qualitatively similar posi-
tive eﬀect on her labor force participation as would a tax credit on earned 
income.9
Child care subsidies aﬀect labor force participation positively, as does an 
in- work beneﬁ  t, but the child care subsidy is in kind. It distorts consumption 
in favor of child care, as Sherwin Rosen pointed out. An alternative that 
would avoid this distortion would be to transform the child care subsidy 
into a lump-  sum transfer to families with small children, conditional on 
both parents working a signiﬁ  cant number of work hours. Such a policy 
would provide the same incentives to work but would not distort the con-
sumption mix.
Were the current child care subsidy, which is about 85,000 SEK per child 
and per year (slightly less than one-  third of the median income), instead 
distributed as a check to eligible families, they could spend this transfer 
8. Since the 2001 reform, unemployed workers have had limited access to child care (ﬁ  fteen 
hours per week).
9. As our model analysis reveals, the incentives to choose work hours for those already work-
ing will be diﬀerent if we compare the Swedish child care subsidy with an in-  work beneﬁ  t of 
the EITC type. This is a consequence of diﬀerences in how they are constructed in terms of 
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on market-  purchased child care or solve their child care problems through 
ﬂ  exible work times, relatives, or some other way, so they could instead use 
this transfer for consumption of other goods and services. While this is a 
policy worth considering, it is not without its own potential distortions. For 
example, publicly provided high-  quality child care can be viewed as educa-
tion, which has potentially positive externalities.
Appendix
A Model of Female Work Behavior: The Case of Paid Parental Leave
In this appendix, we build a basic model to study the eﬀects on female 
career choices and incomes of the two daddy-  month reforms. Available for 
download at: http:/ / people.su.se/ ~akolm/ , you will also ﬁ  nd the formal anal-
ysis of the other policy reforms considered in this chapter.
The basic model is set in two periods. In the ﬁ  rst period, women are 
married, whereas in the second period, there is an exogenous probability, 1 –  
p, that the marriage will be dissolved. At the beginning of the ﬁ  rst period, the 
woman makes her career choice. By allocating her available time into market 
work, LM, and family work, LH, she can decide how much of a market-
  oriented career and how much of a family-  oriented career she wants to 
make. As the allocation of time also has consequences for the future, she 
allows for the future possibility that the marriage will dissolve when mak-
ing her time allocation decision. The payoﬀ from investing in market work 
is given by the net wage income, wLM –   T(wLM;.), where w is the wage, and 
T(wLM;.) is the tax payments. The tax schedule is T(wLM;.)   B(wLM)2 –   A, 
where A and B are parameters.
Women derive utility from material good consumption, C, and from the 
consumption of a family good, F, which we interpret here as care for chil-
dren. The family good can be produced/  consumed at home by the mother, 
FH, or by the father, F , or it can be purchased in the market, FM, where 
these are perceived to be perfect substitutes; that is, F   FM   FH   F . 
The mother produces the family good by use of own time, LH, through the 
concave production function FH   L 
H,     1.10 The payoﬀ from investing 
time in the family is the utility the care time yields.
The ﬁ  nancial aspect of the paid parental leave is allowed for by adding 
a proportional subsidy for each time unit allocated to family activity in 
the ﬁ  rst period. The derived utility of the ﬁ  rst period is v(F)   wLM –   
10. It does not matter for the results that F  is introduced as linear in father’s time, although 
the woman’s time enters through a concave function. Moreover, it does not aﬀect the results 
if we assume that FM   LM –   F ; that is, if we assume that the demand for child care has to be 
equal to the time when no one is at home.Policies Affecting Work Patterns and Labor Income for Women    7 7
B(wLM)2   A –   kFM   S(LH;.), where v(F) captures the utility from care 
for children, and wLM –   B(wLM)2   A –   kFM   S(LH;.) captures the utility 
from material good consumption. Material good consumption is simply 
given by the income net of taxes and the payment from paid parental 
leave, S(LH;.), subtracting the expenses for market-  purchased child care, 
kFM, where k is the price of market-  purchased care for children. The pay-
ment from paid parental leave is given by S(LH;.)   sLH if LH   L H, and 
S(LH;.)   sL H if LH   L H. Thus, if staying home with children more 
hours than L H, then the ceiling of the paid parental leave is reached. The 
female spouse cannot then reap more paid parental leave by increasing 
her family time.
In the second period, the children are older (possibly grown-  up), and the 
utility is simply given by the income net of taxes, which is used for material 
good consumption, wLM –   B(wLM)2   A. Imposing the time constraint, T    
LM   LH, and ignoring discounting, the expected present value can be written:
 EV   v[FM   F    (T    LM) ]   2wLM 
    2B(wLM)2   2A   kFM   S(T    LM;.).
The female spouse chooses both the time allocation and how much of the 
family good she wants to purchase from the market in order to maximize the 
expected present value. For an interior solution, LM, LH ∈ (0,T ) and FM   0, 









   v (F)   k   0,
where S (LH;.)   s if LM   L M, and S (LH;.)   0 if LM   L M.
The objective function is continuous but has a kink point at LM   L M in 
the presence of the paid parental leave system. We have to consider both 
cases: when female spouses choose to exhaust their periods of paid parental 
leave, LM   L M, and when they do not use all of the periods of paid parental 
leave they are entitled to, LM   L M.
The government budget constraint is fulﬁ  lled at all times by allowing for 
adjustments in the parameter B:
2[BL2
M   A]    [S(T    LM;.)   sF ],
where   ∈ [0,1] captures the share of the government expenditures that is 
ﬁ  nanced by the female workers.
11. Note that this particular policy problem can be solved independent of the size of p; for 
the analysis of the other policies in this chapter, see http:/  /  people.su.se/  ~akolm/  .78    Ann-Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward P. Lazear
The Daddy Months
In 1995, the ﬁ  rst daddy month was introduced. The reform implied that 
one month of the paid parental leave must be used by each parent. In prac-
tice, it meant that fathers could no longer transfer all their paid parental 
leave to the mother. Unless at least one month was used by the father, it 
could not be used by either of the parents. In 2002, the second daddy month 
was implemented. The reform reserved two months for each parent. At the 
same time, the total time of entitlement to paid parental leave for the family 
increased by thirty days. In essence, this implied that an extra month avail-
able only for fathers was added to the existing paid parental leave scheme.
We represent these two types of reforms by letting F  increase. By increas-
ing F , we increase the father’s family time. In a reform similar to the 2002 
reform, this will have no impact on the mother’s available time for paid leave, 
L M. The results are as follows:
Proposition A1: Increased paid family time of fathers, F , will reduce or 
have no impact on women’s investment in a market career and will increase 
poverty among divorced women.
Proof: All propositions follow from the diﬀerentiation of the ﬁ  rst-  order 
conditions and the government budget constraint. Poverty among divorced 
women, for simplicity, is measured by the disposable income of divorced 
women. The welfare gap is measured by the utility diﬀerence of married 
and divorced women.
An increase in the father’s time at home initially induces the mother to 
reduce the market-  purchased care time by an equivalent amount. However, 
as the reform is ﬁ  nanced by increased taxation, the mother ﬁ  nds it optimal 
to work less and instead spends more time at home (reducing her market 
purchase of care time even more). The reform thus induces mothers to stay 
home longer with their children in response to fathers increasing their paren-
tal leave time. Poverty among divorced women increases, both because they 
choose to invest less in a market career, and because the reform induces tax 
increases.
Also, if women bunch at the kink point (i.e., LM   L M), the required tax 
increases will reduce the incentives to work. However, the budget eﬀect may 
not be strong enough to counteract the bunching at the kink point.
When considering the 1995 reform, we have to allow for the fact that this 
reform implies that LM falls by an equivalent amount, leaving the family’s 
total time of paid parental leave periods intact. The results are as follows:
Proposition A2: Increased paid family time of fathers. F , leaving the total 
time of paid parental leave intact, will (a) leave women’s investment in market 
work and poverty among divorced women unaﬀected if women allocate more 
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in market work and increase poverty among divorced women if women do not 
exhaust their periods of paid parental leave; or (c) increase women’s invest-
ment in market work and reduce poverty among divorced women if women 
bunch at the kink point.
In case women take more leave than the system pays for, there is no need 
to increase taxes in order to ﬁ  nance the reform. The reform is self-  ﬁ  nanced, 
as the lump- sum parental leave payments to women are reduced by the same 
amount as the cost of ﬁ  nancing a longer paid parental leave for fathers. 
Therefore, the career choices and economic situation of divorced women 
are unaﬀected.
On the other hand, in case women do not exhaust their periods of paid 
parental leave, the reduction in L M has no eﬀect on women’s investment in a 
market career. Thus, the analyses of the previous proposition hold.
In case the father’s paid family time increases in a situation where women 
bunch at the kink point, female investment in a market-  oriented career 
will increase. Women who choose exactly to exhaust their periods of paid 
parental leave face a reduction in the marginal cost of working when their 
available periods of paid leave are reduced. This follows because increased 
working time is no longer associated with a reduction in the beneﬁ  ts of paid 
parental leave. Thus, the incentive to invest in a more market- oriented career 
has improved, which also improves the economic situation of divorced 
women.
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